# LEADERSHIP IN MODERN WARS: HOW THE FRENCH AND AMERICAN ARMIES HAVE IMPLEMENTED LEADER DEVELOPMENT AND EDUCATION 2001-2014

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army
Command and General Staff College in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree

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This thesis analyzes and compares how lessons learned in recent operations have shaped different leader development and education models in both the U.S. and the French army. However, the lessons learned alone cannot explain how the leadership models change in different ways. Armies evolve in their doctrine through the actual lessons learned and their analysis, but also through their national and military culture, and through their respective operational background. How all these different elements combine to shape diverging conclusions from comparable experiences can help both armies to deepen their mutual understanding, exchange best practices and operate more efficiently without renouncing their specificities.

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ABSTRACT

LEADERSHIP IN MODERN WARS: HOW THE FRENCH AND AMERICAN ARMIES HAVE IMPLEMENTED LEADER DEVELOPMENT AND EDUCATION 2001-2014, by Major Jean Michelin, 90 pages.

During the last fifteen years, the French Army and the American Army have been engaged together in combat operations in Afghanistan and on other theaters. Both armies, regardless of their size and capabilities, have had comparable experiences at the tactical level, and drew lessons learned from these experiences to renew their doctrine in accordance with the requirements of contemporary warfare.

This thesis analyzes and compares how lessons learned in recent operations have shaped different leader development and education models in both the U.S. and the French army. However, the lessons learned alone cannot explain how the leadership models change in different ways. Armies evolve in their doctrine through the actual lessons learned and their analysis, but also through their national and military culture, and through their respective operational background. How all these different elements combine to shape diverging conclusions from comparable experiences can help both armies to deepen their mutual understanding, exchange best practices and operate more efficiently without renouncing their specificities.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

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ACRONYMS

ADP   Army Doctrine Publication

ADRP   Army Doctrine Reference Publication

CAC   Combined Arms Center

CAL   Center for Army Leadership

CALL   Center for Army Lessons Learned

CASAL   CAL Annual Survey of Leadership

CDEF   Centre de la Doctrine et de l'Emploi des Forces [Center for Doctrine and
                the Employment of Forces]

COIN   Counterinsurgency

EMAT   État-Major de l'Armée de Terre [Army Staff Headquarters]

FAR   Force d'Action Rapide [Rapid Action Force]

FT   Forces Terrestres [Land Forces]

IED   Improvised Explosive Device

ISAF   International Security and Assistance Force

NATO   North-Atlantic Treaty Organization

NCO   Non-Commissioned Officer

OEF   Operation Enduring Freedom

OIF   Operation Iraqi Freedom

PDI   Power Distance Indicator

RMA   Revolution in Military Affairs

ROTC   Reserve Officer Training Corps

UAI   Uncertainty Avoidance Index

UN   United Nations

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW

In the history of western societies and governments, few institutions have been more wrong than armies. Armies fight, win, and lose wars. Defining war, this quintessentially human endeavor, has caused heated debate through the centuries and the notion of war is still regarded today as ever evolving. Armies fight in the realm of uncertainty and friction, where "everything in war is very simple, but the simplest thing is difficult,"[1] according to Clausewitz. In war, armies miscalculate, make mistakes, misread their enemy or their resources. This might have made sense when armies were temporary bodies with little "organizational memory;" however, modern armies are standing organizations, which train and prepare for the next war. The French Army in 1940, entrenched in bunkers, wanted to fight the First World War again and, as a result, disintegrated in weeks. Before that, Napoleon conquered Europe by repeatedly defeating armies that failed to adapt to an unprecedented form of warfare. History is rich with examples of surprising collapses, last-minute recoveries and unpreparedness from armies of all nations. Every new generation of military leaders knows the anguish of being committed to war while being unprepared to face the next challenge.

Nevertheless, as mature organizations, modern armies train, equip, and prepare for war relying on an evolving doctrine, learning the lessons from previous commitments, and envisioning their future - often in a very prescriptive way. The fact that armies strive

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[1] Carl Von Clausewitz, *On War*, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984), 119.

to be ready for the next war and still make mistakes reveals much about the complexity of war.

Background

When preparing for the future, one of the enduring aspects of training army leaders impose upon the organization is leader development and education. Training future officers and senior enlisted soldiers remains an enduring priority in modern military institutions. Senior leaders never fail to acknowledge this priority.[2]

The French Republic and the United States of America (hereafter referred to as France and the U.S., respectively) have a significant and often common history in warfare. In the twenty-first century, France and the U.S. have shared a similar, and sometimes common, experience in war. Following the terrorist attacks on New York City and Washington, DC on September 11, 2001, political leaders of both countries committed troops to a long and uncertain conflict in Afghanistan. They have, separately, faced comparable threats and challenges elsewhere, in Iraq for the U.S. and in Africa for France. Although different in size, combat power, and resources, both countries maintain an all-volunteer, all-professional, technologically advanced army. They share a common set of values and, in spite of disagreements that can sometimes be severe, remain close allies. The French Army and the U.S. Army have more in common than their respective size and strategic reach would suggest.

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[2] David Vergun, "Odierno: Leader development No. 1 priority," U.S. Army Official Website, February 12, 2014, accessed October 7, 2015, http://www.army.mil/article/120024/Odierno_Leader.

Both countries place an emphasis on leaders, current and future. Both armies rely on prestigious academies to educate future officers: the United States Military Academy at West Point, and the Ecole Spéciale Militaire de Saint Cyr. Both academies were founded in 1802. French and American cadets have trained for more than two centuries to be the future commanders of armies, and have, more often than not, paid a severe price to the respective ineptness of their education.

Modern armies also rely on doctrine to conduct operations.[3] In recent times, both the French and U.S. Armies staff a permanent organization[4] whose mission is to collect information and lessons from the latest engagements and operations, and develop doctrine in consequence. Acknowledging the uncertain and changing nature of war, both armies rely on a process to use these lessons to improve their training and preparation. Lessons learned in the field by combat units of all echelons, successes and setbacks are documented and analyzed. After analysis, these lessons learned are transformed and become training requirements, procedures, and processes. Finally, the results of the lessons learned process are disseminated across the respective armies, and used to select, educate, and train the next generations of officers. This process, from the collection of

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[3] John Spencer, "What is Army Doctrine?," Modern War Institute at West Point, March 21, 2016, accessed April 18, 2016, http://www.modernwarinstitute.org/what-is-army-doctrine/.

[4] The Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL), for the U.S. Army, is a subordinate to the Combined Arms Center (CAC), specifically in charge of doctrinal development. For the French Army, the Centre de la Doctrine et de l'Emploi des Forces (CDEF: Center for Doctrine and the Use of Force) combines the role of processing lessons learned and producing capstone doctrine.

learning experience to its implementation across the force, is specific to each army, but the core principle is identical.

The French and U.S. Armies have a comparable recent experience, an institutionalized lessons learned process, a trusted leader development and education model, and an adaptive doctrine. Yet, the way both armies train, educate, and operate, suggests significantly different conclusions, grown from this apparently common ground.

Problem Statement

Two western Armies with comparable doctrine, technology, culture and recent operational experiences, have nevertheless instituted different leader development models.

Research Questions

To answer this problem, the primary research question addressed by this thesis is the following:

What factors might explain the differences in the evolution of the French and the U.S. Armies' leader development models?

This question will remain the focal point of this thesis, but it consequently raises further interrogations:

How have past operational experiences influenced leader development and education in the French and American armies?

How has doctrine pertaining to leadership evolved in both armies over the considered period?

What is the influence of lessons learned processes on the evolution of leadership

models?

To what extent does national culture influence leader development processes and

systems?[5]

To what extent does military culture influence leader development processes and

systems?

How does organizational values and perspective influence the end product?

Scope of the Study

This thesis will focus on the lessons learned in operations between the terrorist

attacks of September 11, 2001, which can be seen as a turning point in the employment of

armed forces by Western democracies,[6] and December 31, 2014, which marked the

official end of Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan.[7]

Definition of Terms

In order to gain a proper understanding of these questions, some of the terms must

be properly defined. Firstly, in the military realm, the definition of the term "leader" is

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[5] In this sentence, the processes refer to the methods, courses, training and educational content of leader development and education. The systems refer to the institutions, schools, centers of excellence, and instructors involved in leader development and education.

[6] James Burk, "Introduction," in *How 9/11 Changed our Ways of War*, ed. James Burk (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2013), 4.

[7] U.S. Department of Defense, "Obama, Hagel Mark End of Operation Enduring Freedom," Official Website, December 28, 2014, accessed October 31, 2015, http://www.defense.gov/News-Article-View/Article/603860/obama-hagel-mark-end-of-operation-enduring-freedom.

self-explanatory[8] and pertains to the authority in charge of any type of unit. In the official

English translations of the French Army doctrine, the "leader" is referred to as the

"commander,"[9] even though in the common French language this term is usually

associated with unit commanders, company-sized and above. The French use the term

chef, or chief, in most of their doctrine, understood as a universal translation of the term

"leader:" it refers to any person in charge of subordinates, at any echelon, and is

consequently the best possible equivalent.

The term "leadership" has no equivalent in the French language. When used, it

remains untranslated and usually pertains to organizations not connected to the Army,

such as businesses. In military doctrine and language, "leadership" is usually referred to

as "command." The semantic differences are subtle, and they will not be discussed here.

Consequently, both terms "leader" and "leadership" will be used through this essay,

referring to the closest equivalent in French doctrine.

This thesis will also observe and study Mission Command as part of leadership.

This is a notion specific to the U.S. Army, at least under its current definition.[10] U.S.

doctrinal publications define Mission Command in three forms: as a warfighting function,

as a system of systems, and as a philosophy. The philosophy of mission command is

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[8] Webster-Merriam Dictionary, "Leader," accessed November 4, 2015, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/leader.

[9] Centre de la Doctrine et de l'Emploi des Forces, *FT-05, The Tactical Commander's Guide to Command and Control in Operations* (Paris, France: Ministry of Defense, 2010).

[10] The French doctrine also mentions Mission Command, but only as a command philosophy. The differences will be studied in subsequent chapters.

defined in U.S. Army doctrine as "the exercise of authority and direction by the commander using mission orders to enable disciplined initiative within the commander's intent to empower agile and adaptive leaders in the conduct of unified land operations."[11] The principles of this philosophy will be reviewed in greater detail in the following chapter, but, in this thesis, the use of the words "Mission Command" will pertain to the philosophy of leadership only.

Finally, this thesis will also consider cultural implications of the evolution of leadership models. The word culture in its organizational aspect is defined as "the set of shared attitudes, values, goals, and practices that characterizes an institution or organization."[12] Throughout this thesis, this definition is used when referring to culture in both the French and the U.S. Army. When referring to national culture, another definition is used, namely, that culture is "the customary beliefs, social forms, and material traits of a racial, religious, or social group."[13]

<u>Limitations</u>

Several factors will frame the scope of this thesis. First, one of the limiting factors in this study is the availability of data, especially pertaining to U.S. military lessons learned. The U.S. Army and the French Army are currently engaged in enduring operations, in the Middle East, in Africa, and to some extent in Afghanistan. Lessons

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[11] Headquarters, Department of the Army, Army Doctrine Publication 6-0, *Mission Command* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2014), 1.

[12] Webster-Merriam Dictionary, "Culture," accessed March 6, 2016, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/culture.

[13] Ibid.

learned, unlike doctrine, are often restricted for operational security reasons. Moreover, the author being a French officer has severely restricted the access to classified, U.S. Army lessons learned documents–this will lead the researcher to make an assumption, which will be detailed further on, about U.S. lessons learned.

Another limitation is tied to the ever-evolving nature of doctrine when taking into account the recent operational experiences: the process of implementing change is continuous, which forces this thesis to be limited in its scope. Numerous historical examples exist of doctrinal change driven by conflicts,[14] but they have already been researched and studied in great detail and they are not discussed here. Furthermore, the recent developments of military action, especially from the French perspective after the terrorist attacks in Paris on November 13, 2015, are not discussed either.

This thesis will focus on lessons learned in leadership at the tactical echelons, namely battalion and below. Regarding leader development and education programs, the emphasis is put on junior officers and non-commissioned officers, because this is where both armies are similarly structured and most comparable. The strategic and operational levels are directly linked with the capacities and interests of both countries. It seems less relevant to compare such levels considering the differences in capabilities, reach, and size of French and American military power. Those levels are not included in this thesis.

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[14] In France, for example, the creation of the War College is directly tied to the lessons learned following the Franco-Prussian war of 1870-1871. Acknowledging the failures of leadership at the highest level in the French Army during the past conflict, the Ecole Supérieure de Guerre would be created in 1880 to educate senior officers. Direction de l'Enseignement Militaire Supérieur, "Histoire de l'Ecole Militaire," accessed October 31, 2015, http://www.dems.defense.gouv.fr/dems/connaitre-la-dems/histoire-de-l-ecole-militaire.

Finally, rather than focusing on the lessons learned processes, which translate operational experience into training, education and development, this thesis will focus on the actual outcomes of the processes. The impact of lessons learned on doctrine and on leadership development programs will be studied, along with the evolutions observed, initiated or institutionalized by both armies over the most recent operational commitments.

<u>Assumptions</u>

As mentioned earlier, limited access to U.S. classified lessons learned will require assumptions. The main assumption, which will encompass the others, is lessons learned in recent operations have directly contributed to the evolution of the leadership model in the U.S. Army. This assumption is entirely plausible, because ample sources cite the connection between the evolution of Army operations and the need to implement change.[15] For the French Army, such an assumption is not necessary because the author was able to access lessons learned documents.

Another relevant assumption refers to culture: organizational culture applied to national armies is a subject too complex to be researched extensively within the scope of this study. Hence, we must assume that the armies are emanations of the nations and societies they defend, and consequently, there is a direct connection between national culture and military culture in both France and the U.S.[16] This cultural connection can

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[15] These sources will be studied in greater detail in chapter 2.

[16] Geert Hofstede, Gert Van Hofstede, and Michael Minkov, *Cultures and Organizations, Software of the Mind: Intercultural Cooperation and its Importance for Survival*, 3rd ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2010), 25.

contribute to explanations the way the French and U.S. armies perceive themselves as national organizations, operate, and change. However, we must also acknowledge that both armies are now all-volunteer forces and consequently represent a very small portion of the population of both countries. How this small representation affects the connection between national and military culture will also be discussed.

<div align="center">Purpose and Relevance of Study</div>

The purpose of this thesis is to inform policymakers, stakeholders and senior leaders of the French and the U.S. armies in their reflections on leadership. This research is relevant for both French and American armies, as their cooperation on bilateral activities has been increasing over the last years.[17] First, this thesis can contribute to a better understanding of the organizational cultural differences of both armies, allowing their respective leaders to communicate and operate more efficiently.

Although differences exist, there are many similarities between the French and the U.S. armies. Both are trying to adapt to an increasingly demanding operational environment, and face significant challenges in a constrained financial environment. The national strategic documents of both countries emphasize the role of multinational cooperation to succeed in future missions, as was stated in the latest U.S. National

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[17] François Heisbourg, "Hollande's Martial Prowess," *The New York Times*, February 9, 2014, accessed January 23, 2016, http://www.nytimes.com/ 2014/02/10/opinion/hollandes-martial-prowess.html?hpw&rref=opinion&_r=1.

Security Strategy[18] and the latest French White Paper on Defense and Security.[19] Promoting a shared understanding between both armies is an important aspect of future cooperation in operations.

      The following chapter will describe the various sources and publications pertaining to the research questions. It will also assess the significance of these findings in explaining the different approaches to leader education and development in both armies, considering the recent evolutions of doctrine. The method used and an analysis of the findings will be covered in subsequent chapters.

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[18] US President, *National Security Strategy* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2015)*, 24-25.

[19] Président de la République, *Livre Blanc sur la Défense et la Sécurité Nationale* (Paris, France: Présidence de la République, 2013)*, 61-68.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

The purpose of this chapter is to review the different sources pertaining to the relationship between operational experience and the evolution of leadership programs. This literature review aims to answer the main research question of this thesis, which is as follows: what factors might explain the differences in the evolution of the French and the U.S. Armies' leader development models? To address this subject, it is necessary to study the actual lessons learned by both the U.S. Army and the French Army, taking into consideration the limited access to classified sources. In addition to these official documents, the external sources advocating change, or more generally documenting the evolutions implied by recent operations, will also be covered. We will then study the doctrine of both armies relevant to leadership, and its evolution over the considered period. Following this doctrinal comparison, some aspects of the culture and the role it plays in the way both armies change will also be researched. Other potential factors contributing to drive change in the armies, such as initial leader training and education, will be further developed and analyzed in the following chapters.

Lessons Learned and Leadership Studies in the U.S. Army

The lessons learned and leadership studies in the U.S. Army need to be researched to support the assumption that they fueled the reflection on leader development. They might also support the main hypothesis of this paper, and help to demonstrate that operational experience is an important driver of change within an Army.

To identify a potential link between the lessons learned in operations and the influence on leader development and education requires a review of the relevant operational lessons learned. This is challenging because the sources are classified, and any request for access to the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) is necessarily limited for an international officer. Consequently, the classified information pertaining to the lessons learned in Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) could not be accessed in the context of this research.[20]

It will be necessary to make the assumption that some of the lessons learned by the U.S. Army in recent operations hinted at the need for a decentralized, mission-orders based leadership model.[21] The U.S. Army regularly publishes unclassified documents on the CALL public website,[22] but most of these are focused on very specific best practices and only pertain remotely to leader development. The Center for Army Leadership (CAL) unclassified website[23] is more directly related to leader development and leadership as a whole. Mission Command as a philosophy is not mentioned in the 2011

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[20] The committee for this thesis has reached a consensus that these assumptions are warranted. This consensus is based on their military experience, especially pertaining to the processes implementing lessons learned into doctrine and army evolution.

[21] This leadership model is itself not recent, but the expression "mission command philosophy" to describe this type of model dates back to 2008, from an attempt to focus on the human aspect and back away from a technology-driven approach to leadership. Col (Ret) Clinton J. Ancker, III, "The Evolution of Mission Command in U.S. Army Doctrine, 1905 to Present" *Military Review* (March-April 2013): 51.

[22] Center for Army Lessons Learned, "Publications," accessed January 29, 2016, http://usacac.army.mil/organizations/mccoe/call/publications.

[23] Center for Army Leadership, "Leader Development Resources," accessed January 29, 2016, http://usacac.army.mil/organizations/mccoe/cal/ldrdevelopment.

CAL Annual Survey of Leadership (CASAL) report[24] whose main findings mention

concerns of toxic leadership[25] and the quality of leader development at the unit level

outside of the operational environment.[26] In comparison, the 2014 CASAL reports

mentions the fact that the implementation of Mission Command at the unit level has

contributed to improve leader development.[27] The evolution of the findings in CASAL

reports supports the assumption that the lessons learned had an influence on the leader

development processes in the U.S. Army.

CAL also developed the Army Mission Command Strategy for the years 2013-

2019, in which the Chief of Staff of the Army, then General Odierno, emphasized the

implementation of Mission Command as a philosophy of trust and empowerment, which

must be applied in leader development.[28] All these documents point to a significant

change in doctrine pertaining to leader development within the considered period in time,

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[24] Center for Army Leadership, "CASAL: Army Leaders' Perception of Army Leaders and Army Leadership Practices, Special Report, 2011-1," June 2011, accessed January 31, 2016, http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/Repository/CASAL_TechReport2011-1_V1.pdf.

[25] Ibid., 9.

[26] Ibid., 12.

[27] Center for Army Leadership, "2014 Center for Army Leadership Annual Survey of Army Leadership (CASAL): Military Leader Findings, Technical Report 2015-1," June 2015, accessed January 31, 2016, http://usacac.army.mil/sites/default/files/documents/cal/2014%20CASAL%20Military%20Leader%20Findings%20Report.pdf, ix.

[28] Center for Army Leadership, "U.S. Army Mission Command Strategy, FY 13-19," June 2013, accessed February 2, 2016, http://usacac.army.mil/sites/default/files/documents/mission-command/Army_Mission_Command_Strategy_dtd_12June%202013.pdf, 3.

2001 to 2014, even though the direct connection between lessons learned in operations and this change can only be inferred using unclassified official sources.

<u>Lessons Learned and Leadership Studies in the French Army</u>

To identify the differences between the French and the American models, it is necessary to study the lessons learned and leadership studies from a French perspective.

In the French Army, the Centre de la Doctrine et de l'Emploi des Forces (hereafter referred to as CDEF)[29] publishes a quarterly review of lessons learned in operations, the diffusion of which is restricted. These lessons learned are usually implemented in the training programs for units on the verge of deployment, and ultimately find their way into the doctrine.

The lessons learned themselves covered a wide range of topics, but the documents reviewed so far do not suggest a recent change in leader development and education in the French Army. Quite the contrary, lessons learned repeatedly mention that the basic training officers receive, when completed with the training in preparation for deployment, grant young officers "a remarkable sense of autonomy"[30] and that the leader development and education model is adapted to the exigencies of complex environments.[31] More generally, the lessons learned mention that the doctrine pertaining to tactical missions of

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[29] Center for Doctrine and Use of Forces, the French Army organization in charge of collecting lessons learned and implementing doctrine.

[30] Centre de la Doctrine et de l'Emploi des Forces, *Retour d'expérience 2010-2, octobre-décembre* (Paris, France: Ministry of Defense, 2010), 27. Access to this document is restricted.

[31] Ibid.

small echelons and the army's planning process are adapted to theaters of operations such as Afghanistan.[32] Upon the deployment to Mali, for Operation Serval in 2013, the lessons learned mentioned the importance of leadership development and training for captains.[33] This is consistent with recent French operations, where most of the combined-arms tactical actions are conducted at company level, with a strong emphasis on autonomy and initiative on the part of the leader.[34]

It appears that lessons learned by the French Army between 2001 and 2014 did not urge for adaptation of the leader development and education process, but rather for sustaining the existing model. This can be regarded as a singularity in the evolution of the French Army, because all other warfighting functions[35] have endured changes of varying scale.[36]

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[32] Centre de la Doctrine et de l'Emploi des Forces, *Retour d'expérience 2010-1, avril-octobre* (Paris, France: Ministry of Defense, 2010), 35. Access to this document is restricted.

[33] Centre de la Doctrine et de l'Emploi des Forces, *Lessons Learned from Operation Serval, January-May 2013* (Paris, France: Ministry of Defense, 2013), 50. Access to this document is restricted.

[34] Ibid.

[35] Referred to as operational functions or *fonctions opérationelles* in the French doctrine. They have the same meaning than the U.S. warfighting functions, with minor differences.

[36] Ludovic Perche, "Les Fonctions Opérationnelles Terrestres: Une Évolution Nécessaire," *Doctrine,* May 2008, 9.

<u>Other Sources Influencing Leadership Changes</u>
<u>in the U.S. Army</u>

The lessons learned are not the exclusive source of change in leadership doctrine

and its implementation in the French and U.S. Armies. There has been, over the last

decade, a significant volume of published books and articles advocating for an evolution

in this specific domain, from both sides of the Atlantic. These documents are not

systematically produced or published by the Army, but they contribute to fuel the

discussion about actions to be taken and evolutions to be implemented.

It must be noted, first, that both armies seem to observe the practices from one

another in leadership, especially in operations. For example, French officers have

published several synthesis of their experience in Africa in U.S. publications. These

articles provide some insights to the French leadership model.[37] From an American

perspective, the French operational culture in Africa explains the relatively large amount

of autonomy of junior leaders. In many cases, this autonomy can be explained by the

usually small scale of the operations.[38] This operational culture is considered to have a

direct influence on leader education in the French military schools, where autonomy and

initiative are highly regarded.[39] In this particular domain, the French expedition in Mali

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[37] Henri Boré, "Complex Operations in Africa: Operational Culture Training in the French Military," *Military Review* (March-April 2009): 67-71. This article focuses on the importance of understanding one's environment at the lowest tactical levels, and strongly endorses the importance of autonomy of leaders.

[38] David E. Johnson et al., *Preparing and Training For the Full Spectrum of Military Challenges, Insights from the Experiences of China, France, the United Kingdom, India, and Israel* (Washington, DC: Rand Corporation, 2009), 107-110.

[39] Ibid., 66-71.

for Operation Serval in 2013 has been thoroughly observed by the American-based

RAND Corporation in a report prepared for the U.S. Army.[40] The RAND report

summarizes the autonomy of French captains in operations.[41] It also acknowledges the

fact that the French Army usually accepts more risk than the U.S. Army because it lacks

the amount assets in protection, drones and intelligence collection, among many others,

which the U.S. Army has. This scarcity in means, even though the French Army usually

receives support from allied countries, inherently increases the risk of any operation.[42]

This report also underlines that the French efficiency in this particular operation was

largely due to the changes applied to the collective training model following the Afghan

"crucible" after several years of easier peace-keeping-focused operations. This

operational experience from a difficult operation has allowed the French Army to become

more efficient when confronted to persistent combat situations.[43] This observation

explains why the RAND report scarcely mentions leadership beyond the French

preference for maneuver rather than firepower, and the need not to "copy" American

practices.[44]

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[40] Michael Shurkin, *France's war in Mali, Lessons for an Expeditionary Army* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2014).

[41] Ibid., 27.

[42] Ibid., 42.

[43] Ibid., 38.

[44] Ibid., 42.

<u>Other Sources Influencing Leadership Changes</u>
<u>in the French Army</u>

The French Army tends to pride itself of its ability to operate with scarce

resources and opposes this to a caricatured "American way" of war.[45] Nevertheless,

France has also looked toward the American experiences, and the many documents

collecting and synthetizing the lessons learned in the first years following the 9/11

attacks. Even though France declined to join the American-led coalition in Iraq, the Army

nonetheless gathered information on the conduct of operations in increasingly complex

environments. These research documents focus mostly on tactical and operational

experiences, but some mention leadership – especially in the early phase of Operation

Iraqi Freedom.[46] The CDEF clearly intensified its research when the French Army

strengthened its presence in Afghanistan in 2008, and found itself committed in more

intense combat than it had experienced in the previous years. The works of David

Galula[47] or Roger Trinquier,[48] which both mention leadership and autonomy in the

context of counterinsurgency operations, had been largely disregarded in France,

following the traumatic conflict in Algeria. They were first "rediscovered" by the U.S.

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[45] Ibid.

[46] Centre de la Doctrine et de l'Emploi des Forces, *Premier Enseignements Tirés des Opérations en Irak* (Paris, France: Ministry of Defense, 2003), 8-9. This report, focusing on the early stages of the Iraqi campaign, praised the large autonomy conferred to tactical leaders, allowing the force to quickly adapt to changing circumstances.

[47] David Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice* (Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger Security International, 2006).

[48] Roger Trinquier, *A French View of Counterinsurgency*, trans. Frederick A. Praeger (London, England: Pall Mall Press, 1964).

Army, largely under the influence of General David Petraeus when he was the Combined

Arms Center commander in Fort Leavenworth and initiated the work[49] for a revised

counter-insurgency field manual.[50] This American doctrinal effort on counterinsurgency

was, ultimately, transferred to the French Army as well.[51]

However, few French sources actually mention the U.S. Army leadership model,

or its evolution in recent operations. There are documents written in French mentioning

the implementation of the Mission Command philosophy, but these documents were

written by Canadian authors and hence do not fall under the scope of this study. The

absence of sources hint at the fact that beyond the best practices, the French Army was

not specifically looking for examples outside of its own experience to change its

leadership model. This is consistent with the actual content of the lessons learned.

Regarding leadership, the French Army seems rather cautious about any model provided

by American doctrine.[52]

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[49] John Nagl, *Knife Fights, A Memoir of Modern War in Theory and Practice* (New York: The Penguin Press, 2014), 122-124.

[50] Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-24, *Counterinsurgency* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2006).

[51] David Galula was indeed a French officer, but his book was originally written in English and first published in 1964. The first French translation and publication occurred in 2008, more than forty years later.

[52] One after action report from a battle group deployed in Afghanistan in 2011 actually mentions, "The tactical reflection must be maintained at all echelons, in spite of the Americanization of orders which infantilizes the subordinates." Centre de la Doctrine et de l'Emploi des Forces, *Recueil d'Enseignements à l'Usage des Cadres* (Paris, France: Ministry of Defense, 2014), 13. Access to this document is restricted.

In addition to these observations, the CDEF, and namely its directorate for research and lessons learned also produces thematic papers on past conflicts,[53] which can provide additional lessons learned, albeit not systematically linked to the contemporary operations of the French Army. These papers constitute an original input and an addition to the actual lessons learned in operations. In addition, many of them provide concrete inputs and discussion on leadership topics. One article-sized research paper on the French doctrine in 1918, for example, advocates the use of innovators and the encouragement of dialogue in the chain of command,[54] using a historical example to draw lessons. This paper, published in February 2014, was not directly linked to the lessons learned process, but was one contribution among many, which set a climate that fueled the discussions on leadership within the French Army. The CDEF mission explicitly states that military history research is a part of the lessons learned process.[55]

<center>Doctrinal changes in the U.S. Army</center>

It is safe to admit that most sources agree that lessons learned in operations have fueled the debate on doctrinal evolutions at a large scale. Between 2008 and 2010, both

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[53] These papers vary in length and level of detail, but they are usually unclassified and available on the internet website of the CDEF. For example, one of the most recent covers the tactical evolutions of the Syrian conflict from 2011 to 2014. Centre de la Doctrine et de l'Emploi des Forces, *Les Evolutions Tactiques du Conflit en Syrie, 2011-2014* (Paris, France: Ministry of Defense, 2014).

[54] Michel Goya, "La Lettre du RETEX–Recherche, No 12, Les Poilus et l'Anti-Fragilité," *Centre de la Doctrine et de l'Emploi des Forces* (Paris, France: Ministry of Defense, 2014), 4-5.

[55] CDEF, *Missions du CDEF*, June 27, 2013, accessed May 5, 2016, http://www.cdef.terre.defense.gouv.fr/le-cdef/presentation/missions/missions-du-cdef.

the American and the French Armies were committed in combat operations, and both renewed their leadership doctrine.

The U.S. Army included leadership as one aspect of a very comprehensive review of the Air Land Battle doctrinal concept. This review would ultimately lead to the adoption of Unified Land Operations in 2009 as the new doctrinal construct of the Army. This doctrinal framework introduced the notion of Mission Command–defined as a warfighting function, an enabling system, and a philosophy. Mission Command is hence to leadership[56] because its principles describe how commanders exercise their authority by empowering subordinates and encouraging disciplined initiative.[57]

Initially, Mission Command was essentially focused on commanders. Later, the U.S. Army refined its leadership model to extend the Mission Command principles to leaders at all echelons. This change was then codified in another doctrinal capstone document specifically centered on leadership.[58] Army Doctrine Reference Publication 6-22 specifically nests within the principles of Mission Command[59] to describe how leadership aims at developing subordinates.

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[56] Headquarters, Department of the Army, Army Doctrine Reference Publication 6-0, *Mission Command* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2014).

[57] Ibid., 1-1.

[58] Headquarters, Department of the Army, Army Doctrine Reference Publication 6-22, *Army Leadership* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2012).

[59] Ibid., 1-3.

Doctrinal resources are central to the leader development model, which nests within both the Mission Command philosophy and the Army's leadership model.[60] These tenets provide greater autonomy for junior leaders within the context of a commander's intent and a defined endstate. The U.S. Army doctrinal references are very prescriptive and comprehensive in their approach to leadership and leader development, and–minor changes included in the current versions notwithstanding–all date back to the late 2000s, when the Army was in the midst of both operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom.

<u>Doctrinal Changes in the French Army</u>

The French doctrine for land operations, as a whole, has also been significantly refined over that same period, but it is generally less detailed and descriptive than the American doctrine. Leadership doctrine in the French Army, in particular, is built around two capstone documents. One provides general principles in the exercise of leadership[61] across the Army. The second one is more specifically focused on the exercise of command in operations.[62]

The first document, *L'Exercice du Commandement dans l'Armée de Terre*, whose title can be translated as "the exercise of command in the army" is very broad in its

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[60] Headquarters, Department of the Army, Army Doctrine Reference Publication 7-0, *Training Units and Developing Leaders* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2012).

[61] Etat-Major de l'Armée de Terre, *L'Exercice du Commandement dans l'Armée de Terre* (Paris, France: Ministry of Defense, 2003).

[62] CDEF, FT-05, 2010.

content, but sets several principles, which are to be enforced at all echelons, regardless of rank or status.[63] Dated from 2003, *L'Exercice du Commandement dans l'Armée de Terre* cites several of its previous versions[64] and insists on enduring principles which appear to have shaped the foundations of leadership in the French Army. The most important construct is that the leadership model of the French Army insists on inspiring followership rather than imposing it, through mutual respect and reciprocal trust between the leader and his or her subordinates.[65] The document was published at a time when the French Army had achieved its professionalization and was increasingly involved in operations across the globe, but before the resurgence of intense combat operations.

The second document, *FT-05, the Tactical Commander's Guide to Command and Control in Operations*, is available in English. It is more focused on the operations themselves. Dating from 2010, *FT-05* envisions the exercise of command in complex operational environments, but does not renege the principles set in 2003. Although this document acknowledges the fact that detailed command[66] can sometimes be necessary,[67]

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[63] EMAT, *l'Exercice du Commandement dans l'Armée de Terre,* 2003, 12.

[64] Ibid., 4. The principles set in 1980 revolve around the concept of "freely accepted discipline," which relies on trust, initiative and exigence. These principles are considered enduring in the French Army at a time when it was achieving its transformation into an all-volunteer force and the end of conscription.

[65] Ibid., 9.

[66] Detailed command is the expression use in the English translation of FT-05. It refers to a more directive approach of command and an increased control on subordinates.

[67] Detailed command can be the preferred type of leadership when the situation calls from a centralized vision by the commander, or when operating within a multinational environment. CDEF, FT-05, 2010, 21.

it is viewed as a complement to mission command and not as an opposition to it. Mission command, however, is considered more adapted to the contemporary operational environment.[68]

The doctrinal evolutions of the French Army on leadership are consistent with the lessons learned from recent operational experiences. The capstone documents have indeed been updated, but the changes have been rather cosmetic and seem to have confirmed the French views on leadership instead of questioning them. Focusing on autonomy for junior leaders was already implemented in the French Army, largely for cultural reasons.[69] Consequently, the French Army leadership doctrine is less detailed than the American doctrine. Leaders are usually granted more autonomy in training and leader development. Whether this has proven fruitful will be discussed in subsequent chapters.

<div align="center">Common External Influences on Leadership Evolution</div>

Military doctrine evolves constantly. Actual application of the latest doctrine in operations, however, requires a sustained effort from the units and the commanders to change collective operating habits. This is especially true regarding leadership, because it pertains to culture rather than a set of determined actions and processes. Mission Command, for the U.S. Army, requires a change in the way leaders trust their subordinates and empower them. The effective use of Mission Command requires individual commitment from senior leaders, and a growing sense of responsibility from

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[68] Ibid., 26.

[69] Johnson et al., 121.

junior leaders. Several sources and published documents hint at the fact that this shift in

leadership culture will probably require more than a change in doctrine to be fully

implemented.[70] Other sources hint at a slower change in mentalities in the field than was

expected by the doctrine authors.[71]

In the French Army, the debate on leadership seems less active than in the U.S.

Army. This might be due to a less dramatic evolution. As discussed in earlier paragraphs,

the change to the French leadership capstone documents was rather cosmetic. The initial

success of Operation Serval in Mali in January 2013 also seems to have reinforced the

conviction that the leadership model of the French Army is satisfactory.[72] The debate

across the French Army focuses more on the Army's role and its ability to resolve

conflicts in the long term[73] than on leadership.

In addition, some researchers expand on the principles of leadership implemented

in both armies, and present their conclusions advocating for further reforms. In the U.S.

Army, some articles advocate for a new way to select and promote leaders, and transform

a talent-management model that seems to have only changed on the margins since the

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[70] Tom Guthrie, "Mission Command: Do We Have The Stomach For What Is Really Required?" *The Army Magazine* (June 2012): 26-28.

[71] "Company Command–Building Combat-Ready Teams." *The Army Magazine* (January 2013): 57-61.

[72] Shurkin, "France's War in Mali," 27.

[73] Many sources discuss these aspects of modern warfare, in France and in the U.S., but they are not directly connected to the question of leadership at the tactical echelons. Hence, they will not be detailed here.

Cold War.[74] A similar reflection also exists in France,[75] but the selection process for young leaders to access battalion-level and above responsibilities has not significantly changed because of these discussions.

On other contextual topics, there has been a significant amount of reflection on the impact of harder, combat-heavy operations on young leaders. The emergence of new operational environments putting increased pressure on young leaders has led to a number of publications analyzing the role of leaders in this situation[76] or the challenges faced by modern military leaders.[77]

<u>The Importance of National Culture in Leadership</u>

Organizational culture is a defining concept for modern armies. Although the French and American armies have been increasingly working together in operations, and although NATO has increased their ability to work within a common doctrine, both armies are, by essence, connected to the society from which they emerge.

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[74] Donald E. Vandergriff, "One Step Forward, Two Steps Back: Mission Command Versus the Army Personnel System," *The Land Warfare Papers*, August 2011, 12-18.

[75] Michel Goya, "L'Anti-Fabrique des Officiers," *La voie de l'Epée blog,* March 28, 2014, accessed February 7, 2016, http://lavoiedelepee.blogspot.com/2014/03/lanti-fabrique-des-officiers.html.

[76] Leonard Wong, "Developing Adaptive Leaders in Iraq and Afghanistan," *Harvard Business Review,* 23 January 2009, accessed 7 February 2016, https://hbr.org/2009/01/developing-adaptive-leaders.

[77] Michael D. Matthews, "21st Century Military Leadership," *Psychology Today, Head Strong Blog,* October 6, 2014, accessed April 19, 2016, https://www.psychology today.com/blog/head-strong/201410/21st-century-military-leadership.

The observation of national culture, however, tends to contradict the lessons learned in recent operations. One indicator in particular, the Power Distance Indicator (PDI), measures how subordinates and leaders interact with each other in varying enterprises.[78] The results of this specific study hint at the fact that the U.S. leaders should be more inclined to trust their subordinates and empower them. In contrast, the French leaders are viewed as more autocratic and paternalistic.[79] Yet, the perception of leadership in both armies seems entirely different from this study.

Another aspect covered by Geert Hofstede in national culture is the avoidance of uncertainty, namely how national cultures react to ambiguous situations and an uncertain future.[80] Here again, the U.S. culture seems to be more tolerant of ambiguity than the French culture.[81] Should we apply this reasoning to military leadership, again, the U.S. leaders ought to be more comfortable in empowering their subordinates than the French leaders. In contrast, the authors state that lower tolerance for ambiguity and uncertainty does not mean that creativity and efficiency are constrained.[82]

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[78] The PDI illustrates with which type of leadership employees are most comfortable. For example, a country with a "small" power distance will usually favor a collegial type of leadership and a less centralized authority. A country with a higher power distance will usually develop organizations with a more rigid and vertical chain of command. Interestingly, the surveys show that subordinates are more comfortable with a system coherent with their national power distance. Hofstede, Hofstede, and Minkov, 61.

[79] Ibid., 58-59.

[80] Ibid., 190.

[81] Ibid., 192-194.

[82] Ibid., 212.

While these elements do not entirely contradict the influence of national culture on military culture, this is an interesting aspect, which demonstrates that this influence is complex, and that military culture is not just the transcription of management culture.

Foundations of the U.S. Military Culture

To try to solve the paradox of a national culture, which contradicts the leadership studies in the French and U.S. armies, it is necessary to try to identify some tenets of military culture.

The first aspect to be considered is the ancient confrontation between Jomini and Clausewitz, the two prominent military thinkers who shaped western armies' strategic thinking.[83] From a French perspective, both are regarded as equally useful[84] and should not be opposed, Jomini for his set of principles and formulas, and Clausewitz for his more uncertain and pessimistic approach to war. On the contrary, the U.S. military culture seems to have been more consistently influenced by Jomini and to be more positivist than the French one,[85] with a scientific approach to warfare.

This scientific mentality in the U.S. Army contributes to explain the enthusiasm for technological solutions and processes that dominated the American military culture during the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA), a doctrinal construct which denied the

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[83] Although comparing their differences is not the purpose of this study, they are both regarded as the "founding fathers of strategic theory:" Hervé Coutau-Bégarie, *Traité de Stratégie*, 6th ed. (Paris, France: Economica, 2008), 227.

[84] Ibid., 228.

[85] Vincent Desportes, *Le Piège Américain: Pourquoi les Etats-Unis Peuvent Perdre les Guerres d'Aujourd'hui* (Paris, France: Economica, 2011), 122.

Clausewitzian concepts of friction and fog of war,[86] deeming them outdated given the superiority of military technology. This vision of warfare had a significant influence on the U.S. Army which deployed in Iraq with a technological view of mostly conventional operations. Facing the challenges of a complex environment of counterinsurgency, the U.S. Army had to adapt, an evolution which fueled the doctrinal evolutions observed after 2007.[87]

<div align="center">Foundations of the French Military Culture</div>

The French military culture has a quite different background. While the U.S. military focused on conventional warfare after the trauma of Vietnam, in an evolution which led to the RMA, the French developed a twofold culture following the end of the war in Algeria and France's withdrawal from NATO. On one hand, the conscription army focused on conventional combat and nuclear deterrence in the context of the Cold War, and on another hand, a small contingent of enlisted soldiers and career leaders experienced a small-scale, expeditionary type of warfare.[88]

The creation of the "Force d'Action Rapide" (FAR) or Rapid Action Force in 1984 merged the two cultures because, while the FAR was initially designed for high-intensity combat in the heart of Europe, its availability and its operational outreach with

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[86] Williamson Murray, "Does Military Culture Matter?" *Orbis* (Winter 1999): 37-38. Cited by Desportes, 2011, 136-137.

[87] Joseph Henrotin, *La Technologie Militaire en Question, le Cas Américain et ses Conséquences en Europe*, 2nd ed. (Paris, France: Economica, 2013), 195.

[88] Anne-Henry de Russé, "France's Return into NATO: French Military Culture and Strategic Identity into Question," *Focus Stratégique* (October 2010): 11.

the use of helicopters and light infantry led to its commitment in most of the national-level operations conducted overseas.[89] Consequently, the training of leaders emphasized autonomy in decision-making and versatility in operations, viewed as a foundation of French military culture.[90]

When the French Army suspended conscription, following the lessons learned of its participation to the Gulf War in 1990-1991, and turned to an all-volunteer force in 1995, its smaller army inherited the deployment culture of the FAR in the various operations conducted in the Balkans, in Africa, and later in Afghanistan.[91] Consequently, leader development and education in the first years of the French transition to a professional army retained some enduring principles of cultural awareness, versatility in operations among populations,[92] and autonomy for junior leaders.

The French and U.S. armies have built different military cultures based on their diverging experiences over time. While these cultures are significantly different from one another, and surprisingly contradictory to some aspects of the national culture, they also seem to have contributed to different evolutions of leadership over the recent operational experiences.

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[89] Ibid., 16.

[90] Ibid.

[91] Henri Boré, "Se Préparer aux Opérations Extérieures, l'Expérience Française," *Doctrine* (June 2006): 96.

[92] A concept comparable to the four blocks of hybrid wars introduced by General James N. Mattis and Lieutenant Colonel (ret) Frank G. Hoffman, "Future Warfare, the Rise of Hybrid Wars," *Proceedings* (November 2005): 18-19.

Summary of Literature Review

The literature on the evolution of leadership models points at the fact that lessons learned played a role in the way both armies have changed in the recent years. However, they represent only a part of the mechanisms for change. Retired officers, scholars, journalists from both sides of the Atlantic Ocean have expanded the reflection on this topic. Relevant sources often include leadership in a broader reflection, as it represents only one aspect of modern armies in contemporary environments. One of these aspects is the organizational culture of both armies, which seem to have an important influence on the way the lessons learned were processed by the French and the Americans.

The following chapter will describe the methodology used through this thesis to illustrate the connection, or the absence thereof, between lessons learned in operations and the impact of doctrinal and cultural changes on leadership. The subsequent chapter will analyze the findings and try to explain the differences observed between the French and American Armies.

CHAPTER 3

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Refined Problem Statement

Leadership is central in the way armies operate. It might not be the main focus of

doctrine, the purpose of which is to set principles for the use of armed force in conflict,

but leadership is often the subject of many debates in modern military institutions. The

French and the U.S. Armies have significantly changed over the last fifteen years.

Increasingly complex operations have stressed the need to review the way the two armies

operate in the field, and this has applied to leader development and education as well.

Two western Armies with comparable doctrine, technology, culture and recent

operational experiences, have nevertheless instituted different leader development

models. This thesis identifies the main factors explaining the different conclusions, and

will answer the following primary research question:

What factors might explain the differences in the evolution of the French and the

U.S. Armies' leader development models?

This question will remain the focal point of this thesis, but it consequently raises

further interrogations:

How have past operational experiences influenced leader development and

education in the French and American armies?

How has doctrine pertaining to leadership evolved in both armies over the

considered period?

What is the influence of lessons learned processes on the evolution of leadership

models?

To what extent does national culture influence leader development processes and systems?

To what extent does military culture influence leader development processes and systems?

How does organizational values and perspective influence the end product?

<u>Hypothesis</u>

To answer the primary research question, the main hypothesis of this paper is that operational experience is an important driver for change in the way armies train and educate their leaders. However, the way this experience is processed and the conclusions drawn from it also depend on national and military culture.

<u>The Case Study</u>

To address the hypothesis and answer the research questions, the case study methodology is the most suitable method of research, for several reasons. After the initial research on the topic, it appeared necessary not to limit the scope to the sole lessons learned of both armies. Leadership models have too many tenants and influences, including historical perspectives and cultural aspects, to be influenced only by the current operational experience.

Consequently, a contemporary comparative analysis in the form of a case study has been identified as appropriate in the context of this research.[93] The main purpose of this thesis is to inform stakeholders in policy and doctrine development in both countries

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[93] Kenneth Long, notes from "Case Study Research Lecture," email message to author, April 14, 2016.

on the identified mechanisms of change when it comes to leadership doctrine. The research illustrates that the evolution of leadership models is a complex process, which cannot be connected only to the lessons learned process.[94] In this regard, main stakeholders would benefit from acknowledging the broader context of the doctrinal evolutions to allow a better implementation in their respective armies.

The case study methodology was used as a framework to compare and contrast the approach of the two armies in their differences. The research identified several aspects which could possibly explain the differences observed in the conclusions reached by both armies, and compared them to address the secondary research questions.

<u>Research Methodology</u>

The research methodology used for this thesis could not be quantitative. The early research on leader development and education models in both armies suggested that there was a strong contextual and cultural aspect to them. Consequently, the qualitative research, understood as a process in which the researcher is "the instrument, or the tool, for designing, collecting and analyzing research"[95] was deemed more appropriate to conduct the study.

Practically, for this research, the starting point was the leadership doctrine of both armies, and more specifically how that doctrine had evolved over the considered period. Observing that the doctrine in both armies had changed, but it had changed differently led

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[94] Ibid.

[95] Q: Foundations of Qualitative Research in Education, "Qualitative Research in Education," accessed April 21, 2016, http://isites.harvard.edu/icb/icb.do?key word=qualitative&pageid=icb.page340273.

to a primary research hypothesis that different lessons learned were the reason for this different orientation. The research then focused on lessons learned, when they could be accessed, and institutional publications on leadership, to try to identify the origins of this difference.

This research led to two findings. First, the lessons learned, or their analysis at the tactical level, were comparable for both armies. Second, operational experience was identified as a major driver for change in the French Army and in the U.S. Army alike, but it did not fully explain the differences observed. This led to a refined research hypothesis, which was that other factors influenced the way the operational experience was processed and led to doctrinal change. Consequently, the research was oriented on the identification and analysis of these potential other factors, which are discussed in chapter 4 and include the following: the respective context of operations for both armies, the initial training models of junior leaders, the inertia of experience and the influence of culture.

Finding and analyzing these other aspects was sufficient to explain the differences observed between the two armies within the scope of this thesis, even though their analysis was limited to their relevance to the research questions.

Perspective of the Researcher and Potential Biases

Comparing culturally driven models from two countries requires from the researcher to be aware of his potential biases in a qualitative approach. The researcher in

this case being a French officer, it is necessary, both for the researcher and for its readers, to opt for a position of cultural relativism.[96]

Moreover, national culture in the qualitative approach to research also implies that certain aspects of the analysis are prioritized over others. Pascal, French philosopher of the 17th century, eloquently wrote on national cultural perspective, "There are truths on this side of the Pyrenees that are falsehoods on the other."[97] In other words, and this thesis is no exception, it is not always possible to transfer models from the country they were developed to the other.[98] The difficulty to observe a neutral position and the risk of biased perceptions in potential recommendations is the reason why this thesis' purpose is to inform rather than to recommend.

Outline of the Analysis

Some of the main drivers of change have been identified in the second chapter. The following chapter will expand on the recent operational history of both the French and the U.S. Army, and compare the respective context of the operations led by these armies. We will then analyze how the tactical experiences were comparable, and how, putting the context into perspective, they led to different conclusions. Following this

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[96] Understood as the necessity to suspend judgment when comparing different cultures. Hofstede, Hofstede and Minkov, 25.

[97] Translated from French and cited by Geert Hofstede, *Culture's Consequences, International Differences in Work-Related Values* (London, UK: Sage Publications, 1988), 253.

[98] Ibid.

initial analysis, we will broaden the scope of the analysis by studying the leader initial

training models and put it in perspective with the organizational cultures of the armies.

CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS

The purpose of this chapter is to analyze and put in perspective the compared outcomes of leadership evolution in both armies.

<u>Comparing the Context of Operations</u>

From 2001 to 2014, the French and the American armies have evolved significantly due to intense operational commitment, but in a different context. We must briefly address this context in order to properly understand the impact it has at the tactical level, which is the focal point of this study.

When the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 happened, the French Army had almost achieved its transition to an all-volunteer force for approximately two years, the last conscripts being scheduled for release in 2002. The transition had taken less than six years and resulted in a drastic cut in manpower.[99] Foreign Legion and Marine battalions, which are part of the Army, professionalized in the 1960s and were the only units to engage in operations since the end of the war in Algeria in 1962, to include the deployment of a professional division during Operation Desert Storm.[100] The newly

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[99] The French army counted 268,572 men and women in 1996, including civilians. This number had decreased to 172,626 in 2002 and to 117,988 in 2012. Source: Fondation pour la Recherche sur les Administrations et les Politiques Publiques (iFRAP), "Bilan de 15 Ans de Réduction des Effectifs au Ministère de la Défense," January 21, 2015, accessed March 31, 2016, http://www.ifrap.org/etat-et-collectivites/bilan-de-15-ans-de-reduction-des-effectifs-au-sein-de-la-defense.

[100] The refusal of then French president François Mitterrand to deploy conscripts to Iraq in 1990 and the following difficulties to deploy 12,500 enlisted soldiers is considered as one of the main arguments to end conscription in the evolving strategic

professional army was only starting to build a common operational experience by 2001.[101]

As a result, the French Army relied on a very heterogeneous population of young enlisted soldiers, a generation of senior NCOs and officers, which just transitioned from a conscription army, and entire units trained and experienced in limited operations. There already was concern about the rhythm of deployments in several branches, but the army as a whole was more focused on the very broad scope of operational requirements on various theaters and contexts.[102] In consequence, the training standards were frequently re-evaluated to match the latest requirements observed in all theaters. This hints at a trend observable in the French Army during this period, that the lessons learned were given precedence over the renewal of doctrine.

The U.S. Army was in a very different situation at the turn of the 21st century. Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, twenty years before, served as a proof of concept for the conventional, high-intensity operations the U.S. military had been focusing on in the years following the end of the Vietnam War. The trauma of that war was still present in the mind of military leaders, as exemplified by the declaration of President Bush, in early 1991, who famously proclaimed, "the specter of Vietnam has

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context following the end of the Cold War. See Jacques Lanxade, "De la Conscription à l'Armée Professionnelle," *Etudes* (December 2005): 321.

[101] Centre de la Doctrine et de l'Emploi des Forces, *L'Armée de Terre Française 1978-2015, Bilan de 37 Années d'Opérations Ininterrompues* (Paris, France: Ministry of Defense, 2015), 29.

[102] Ibid., 30.

been buried forever in the desert sands of the Arabian Peninsula."[103] Consequently, along with the doctrinal construct of the 1980s, the technological approach of the U.S. Army was actually validated by the lessons learned during the first Gulf War.

In addition, the battle of Mogadishu, in Somalia, during Operation Restore Hope in 1993, had a significant impact on the U.S. reluctance to commit to conflicts outside of the conventional range of operations.[104] "Military Operations Other Than War" or "Low-Intensity Conflicts" were viewed as secondary conflicts.[105] Even though the U.S. Army certainly conducted some of these operations in various theaters, they did not drive the focus away from the information-age warfare. The technological approach to war remained the main driver for transformation in the Army

The U.S. Army, while gaining operational experience in complex environment, remained shaped by its culture of total war and the famous quote of General McArthur: "There is no substitute to victory."[106] The outcome of any war was and remains viewed as a dichotomy between victory and defeat, regardless of the actual meaning of victory in

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[103] Opinion, "Good Morning Vietnam," *The New York Times*, March 10, 1991, accessed March 31, 2016, http://www.nytimes.com/1991/03/10/opinion/good-morning-vietnam.html.

[104] Michael R. Gordon and Thomas L. Friedman, "Details of U.S. Raid in Somalia: Success So Near, a Loss So Deep," *The New York Times,* October 25, 1993, accessed March 31, 2016, http://www.nytimes.com/1993/10/25/world/details-of-us-raid-in-somalia-success-so-near-a-loss-so-deep.html?pagewanted=all.

[105] Nagl, 27.

[106] Desportes, 184.

contemporary conflicts. The dichotomy dictated how the U.S. Army trained its leaders for generations.[107]

The operational context of the French and the U.S. armies, in addition to their culture, shaped their approach to recent conflicts and operations. We have to consider what these operations were over the scope of our study, and analyze common points and differences.

<u>The Operational Experience of the U.S. Army–2001 to 2014</u>

After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the U.S. rapidly set on a war footing to retaliate against Al Qaeda, its allies and partners. The first campaign fought was in Afghanistan. The immediate military response, however, did not initially include much more than Special Forces units. The first conventional units deployed along with international partners after the fall of the Taliban regime near the end of 2001. The U.S. Army did conduct combat operations over the following year, but the rapid retreat of the Taliban and the relative small footprint of foreign military presence ensured a few months of relative calm. In 2003, there were roughly 10,000 U.S. troops in Afghanistan essentially focused on stability tasks,[108] using the doctrine developed over the previous decade.

By this time, the U.S. effort in a defense perspective was Iraq and the plans to overthrow Saddam Hussein's regime. Operation Iraqi Freedom was launched on March

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[107] Ibid., 185.

[108] CNN, "Operation Enduring Freedom Fast Facts," September 30, 2015, accessed April 1, 2016, http://www.cnn.com/2013/10/28/world/operation-enduring-freedom-fast-facts/.

19, 2003, in a very different political and international context than the consensus which prevailed for the operations in Afghanistan two years earlier. Unlike Afghanistan, the Army was decisively engaged in combat operations from the first days, and participated in a joint campaign, which seized Baghdad by April 9. The Iraqi forces were defeated, surrendered or disbanded and the success was so overwhelming that President Bush announced the end of major combat operations on May 1, 2003.[109]

However, the situation rapidly deteriorated as the U.S. brigades and divisions faced an increasingly aggressive guerilla force in some regions, with a failing local administration and no local security forces. Commanders developed innovations in counterinsurgency tactics experimented at the local level. The actions undertaken by the 101st Airborne Division led by then Major General David Petraeus demonstrated this innovative mindset, obtaining good results and inflicting heavy casualties to an insurrection, which was yet to unite.[110] Nevertheless, at the theater level, the situation continued to decline. By the end of 2006, Iraq was spiraling into chaos; while in Afghanistan, the multinational coalition under the banner of NATO was confronted by an unprecedented counterattack of the Taliban, which threatened the regime.[111]

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[109] CNN, "Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation New Dawn Fast Facts," March 31, 2016, accessed April 1, 2016, http://www.cnn.com/2013/10/30/world/meast/operation-iraqi-freedom-and-operation-new-dawn-fast-facts/.

[110] Michel Goya, "L'Innovation Pendant la Guerre Américano-Sunnite en Irak, 2003-2007, " in *La Fin des Guerres Majeures?*, ed. Frédéric Ramel and Jean-Vincent Holeindre (Paris, France: Economica, 2010), 195.

[111] Ibid., 201.

The U.S. military completely reversed the negative trend in Iraq over a few months. The surge of troops, advocated by General Petraeus, the evolution of the U.S. Army counterinsurgency doctrine and the generalization of successful local initiatives all contributed to improve the general situation. The U.S. Army evolved dramatically to adapt to this new environment, and by 2009, most of its doctrine had changed to meet the new threat.

By this time, the situation in Afghanistan had degraded, prompting most participating countries to increase their participation to the operations, and the U.S. to apply its surge strategy there, with varying degrees of success, bringing the number of U.S. troops close to 100,000 by the end of 2009.[112] Most U.S. troops had left Iraq by the end of 2011, and most left Afghanistan by the end of 2014. The subsequent evolutions on both of these theaters will not be discussed here.

Several key aspects characterize the U.S. Army operational experience over this period, and to a degree contributed to shape the way it modified its leadership model. The first aspect is that the U.S. Army has been very significantly engaged in two major conflicts. While some other operations and deployments remained, the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan are undoubtedly the defining events of what the army became and how it evolved. As different as the two theaters are, they played a key role in the way the U.S. Army took some distance from its conventional, technology-focused, high-intensity approach to combat operations. This evolution, to some degree, was dictated by tactical

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[112] CNN, "Operation Enduring Freedom Fast Facts," 2015.

units immersed in a complex environment among populations, and confronted by an enemy they had not really trained to fight.

This operational experience also involved a very important number of troops. An estimated 2.6 million soldiers[113] have served in either theater, the majority of which belonged to the army, and most of them deployed several times.[114] The size of these operations alone makes them significant, because they shaped an entire generation of soldiers and leaders in their approach to warfare and leadership, contributing to the evolutions of the models and perceptions through the army, a change visible in the renewed doctrine. The fact that most leaders of all ranks shared the same experience contributed to disseminate new approaches through the entire organization. It can also be assessed that, in contrast with the French system, the doctrine had precedence over the lessons learned in the evolution of the U.S. Army.

Finally, the Army used the brigade combat team as the basic tactical echelon in both operations. The brigades were integrated in a large command structure comprising divisions and corps, in a joint environment, but they remain the central piece of the tactical level, an aspect which has an influence on training and, ultimately, on leadership when compared to smaller armies who deploy smaller contingents with fewer assets.

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[113] Rajiv Chandrasekaren, "A Legacy of Pain and Pride," *The Washington Post*, March 29, 2014, accessed April 1, 2016, http://www.washingtonpost.com/sf/national/ 2014/03/29/a-legacy-of-pride-and-pain/.

[114] Dave Baiocchi, *Measuring Army Deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2013), 3.

The context of a large force, with sizeable units, a comprehensive sustainment system and numerous joint support assets and enablers can be assessed to have had an influence on the operations at the tactical level.

<u>The Operational Experience of the French Army–2001 to 2014</u>

By the end of 2001, the French Army was committed to several small-scale operations, in the Balkans (Bosnia, Macedonia), in Africa and the Middle-East (Central African Republic, Chad, Ivory Coast, Lebanon)and relied in addition on prepositioned forces in overseas territories and allied nations, mostly in Africa. The focus was clearly on Kosovo, where the French assumed command of a multinational brigade in the northern part of the country. The French units, mostly deployed in the city of Mitrovica, were exposed to outbursts of violence from both sides of the conflict and extensively trained on crowd control techniques.[115]

The deployment of a battalion to Afghanistan in late 2001 for a short mission in Mazar e Sharif, quickly replaced by a battalion in Kabul in early 2002, was essentially symbolic, but contributed to the diversity of operational experiences for a young professional army. The extension of a serious crisis in Ivory Coast led the French to increase their presence by late 2002, a presence which would culminate in 2003 at 3250 soldiers, making Operation "Licorne"[116] the first major operation of the French Army of the beginning of the century. The force was confronted to various threats and levels of

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[115] CDEF, *L'Armée de Terre Française 1978-2015*, 28.

[116] French word for unicorn.

violence[117] in various environments, from crowd control to urban combat operations, to zone and area reconnaissance.

The focus switched again in 2006 with the reinforcement of the French mission under the UN banner in South Lebanon, following the conflict between Israel and the Hezbollah guerilla. Here, the French operated in a "blue-helmet" type of environment and their mission consisted of stabilization tasks and common operations and training with the Lebanese Army.[118]

The year 2008 brought spectacular changes to the French operational environment. First, amid fierce debate, President Sarkozy decided to engage France about full participation and integration into NATO,[119] prompting a reinforcement of the French participation to the International Security and Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan. In an increasingly degrading situation, 10 French soldiers were killed in an ambush in the Uzbeen valley on August 18, 2008,[120] an event that had a considerable impact on the French public opinion, suddenly realizing that French soldiers were engaged in harder combat operations.

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[117] To include the bombing of a French installation in Bouaké on November 6, 2004, by the governmental air force, killing 9 French soldiers. The violence erupted again in riots in Abidjan 3 days later, but ultimately led to the establishment of a UN-mandated force, allowing the French contingent to begin its draw-down. CDEF, *L'Armée de Terre Française 1978-2015*, 28.

[118] Ibid., 25.

[119] Steven Erlanger and Katrin Bennhold, "In Defense Policy, France Turns to U.S. and Europe," *The New York Times*, June 17, 2008, accessed April 4, 2016, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/17/world/europe/17france.html?_r=0.

[120] CDEF, *L'Armée de Terre Française 1978-2015*, 35.

The French participation in the Afghanistan conflict reached about 4000 soldiers in 2010, an unprecedented effort by the French military since the colonial conflicts. A total of 70,000 French soldiers are estimated to have served in Afghanistan from 2001 to 2014, with 89 being killed-in-action and 700 wounded.[121] This operation profoundly transformed the French Army, because required more difficult combat operations than those of the peacekeeping or peace imposition operations of the previous decade. The increased difficulty in the operational environment prompted the French Army leaders to renew the training standards, the sustainment concepts, the equipment of dismounted soldiers, the communication systems, and many other aspects of soldiering and soldier support.[122] This underlines again the precedence of lessons learned over doctrine renewal in the French Army.[123]

The resolution of the crisis in Ivory Coast and the operations in Libya in 2011 contributed to maintaining a diverse operational environment, while over this same period, secondary theaters were either closed (Kosovo) or significantly reduced in size (Lebanon).[124]

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[121] Etat-Major des Armées, "Afghanistan: la Fin d'un Engagement Structurant," December 23, 2014, accessed April 4, 2016, http://www.defense.gouv.fr/operations/ autres-operations/operations-achevees/operation-pamir-2001-2014/actualites/afghanistan-la-fin-d-un-engagement-structurant.

[122] CDEF, *L'Armée de Terre Française 1978-2015*, 35-36.

[123] For example, as of 2010, ramp-up training at the battalion level before a deployment to Afghanistan was systematically mentored by another unit which just had returned from the theater, in order to ensure that the tactical situation was kept up to date for incoming units.

[124] CDEF, *L'Armée de Terre Française 1978-2015*, 38.

Following the withdrawal of combat units in Afghanistan at the end of 2012, the

French Army was preparing itself for fewer deployments and a return to the fundamentals

of training and readiness in a context of budget cuts and austerity, a perspective that

raised many questions following several years of intense operations for the tactical

units.[125] In this context, the intervention in Mali in early 2013 was unexpected and

committed again the French forces to a complex operation in a constrained environment,

with an initial intensive combat phase followed by stability operations. The degrading

situation and looming threat of massacres in the Central African Republic also brought

French forces to another theater, with a mission of stabilization in a very sensitive

context.[126] By the end of 2014, the French Army was still operating under a very active

operational tempo, and considering decreasing its operational commitments to allow units

to reconstitute and train properly.

The operations the French Army led or participated in over the considered period

are marked by their diversity. From crowd and riot control, to counterinsurgency, peace

keeping and peace imposition, air land maneuver, training and mentoring, homeland

defense and disaster relief, the Army has deployed in a variety of different situations. The

short duration of the deployments for the units[127] have led most units to different theaters

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[125] Jean-Dominique Merchet, "La 'Betteravisation,' le Nouveau Concept de l'Armée de Terre pour l'Après-Afghanistan," *Secret Défense* (blog), June 27, 2012, accessed April 4, 2016, http://www.marianne.net/blogsecretdefense/La-betteravisation--le-nouveau-concept-de-l-armee-de-terre-pour-l-apres-Afghanistan_a666.html.

[126] CDEF, *L'Armée de Terre Française 1978-2015*, 39.

[127] The average duration of an operational tour for a French battalion is usually 4 to 6 months, depending on the theater.

and different missions over a relatively short period. French forces have worked

autonomously, within NATO and UN command structures, in bilateral organizations, but

also alongside or integrated in multinational command structures. The size of the

operations remained generally small, with the battalion used as a basis for every

deployment. For example, at the highest point of its presence in Afghanistan, the French

army operated with a brigade comprising two combined-arms ad-hoc battalions, one

aviation battalion, a sustainment battalion and several teams of mentors, enablers, and

Special Forces. The context of the operations significantly changed over the considered

period, with increased combat operations for the units, an evolution that brought

considerable change to a young professional army. We must now analyze how these

operational experiences influenced the evolutions of leadership at the tactical level.

<u>Comparable Experiences at the Tactical Level</u>

In spite of varying experiences in their operations between 2001 and 2014, the

French and U.S. armies have had comparable experiences. At the tactical level, battalion

and below, which is the focus of this study, enduring trends and aspects of the operational

environments render the comparison possible. Therefore, similarities exist in the leader

requirements model in both armies.

The first aspect to consider is the increasingly hardened context of operations.

Both armies have been deployed in stabilization or peacekeeping operations before 2001.

Although these operations sometimes confronted the troops with outbursts of violence,[128]

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[128] The example of Somalia in 1993 is quite significant of this trend, because a
mission initially focused on humanitarian assistance included episodic fights with armed

the initial mission of the troops was not to conduct major combat operations. Special

operations are an exception to this rule, but they are not the focus of this study.

This aspect significantly changed after 2001, when the U.S. began leading

coalition operations into Afghanistan. In 2003, the invasion into Iraq certainly began with

a different focus. In Iraq, the focus of the initial campaign was to topple the Saddam

Hussein regime, and hence constituted the apex of conventional combat operations

against the regular Iraqi armed forces.[129] For the French Army, a similar experience

happened much later, in 2013 during Operation Serval in Mali, where the initial

campaign was clearly aimed at destroying the jihadist forces threatening the Mali capital

and southern, mostly Christian regions of the country. The aftermath of the operation,

like Iraq ten years before, was the transition to a stabilization phase[130] among

populations, with a counterinsurgency aspect. In the more aggressive operations in the

considered period, both armies committed battalions, companies and platoons to

counterinsurgency and stability operations, with several common aspects.

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militias, for both the French and the U.S. contingent. CDEF, *L'Armée de Terre Française 1978-2015*, 26.

[129] Even from an often skeptical French perspective, the offensive operations conducted in the early stages of Operation Iraqi Freedom constituted a validation of the concept of the "modern airland maneuver" and acknowledged the "return of the battle" after several years of stabilization operations. CDEF, *Enseignements de l'Opération Iraqi Freedom* (Paris, 2003), 10.

[130] Interestingly, the command and control architecture and the boundaries of the theater changed to address this specific phase. Operation Serval gave way to Operation Barkhane, which now address the transnational threat in the whole Sahara-Sahel strip and not only within the borders of Mali. CDEF, *L'Armée de Terre Française 1978-2015*, 39.

Quite obviously, both armies had comparable experiences after 2007 in Afghanistan: operating in a geographically constrained environment, mentoring and training of host nation forces, fighting an insurgency dissimulated among civilian populations, facing the common threats of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs), suicide bombers, snipers, and ambushes. All these aspects, among others are relevant to the experience of leaders who served in this specific theater. On other theaters, both armies had to operate in complex environments and among populations whose loyalties were consistently guided towards whoever would provide for their security and basic needs. These requirements were promptly acknowledged by the renewed doctrine on counterinsurgency in France and in the U.S.

Another common aspect of the operations to which leaders had to adapt is the friendly environment. Contemporary operations became increasingly complex indeed, but not only because of the situation in the various theaters. First, the tempo of the operations increased dramatically through enhanced communications, networking systems, and other enabling technologies. The U.S. Army clearly embraced this acceleration of the tempo,[131] to a point where it became central in planning the initial phase of Operation Iraqi Freedom, and contributed to its overwhelming success.[132] The French Army was less enthusiastic and technology-focused, but it nevertheless benefitted from equivalent

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[131] Henrotin, 188.

[132] Ibid., 189.

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technological advances, which unquestionably increased the operational capabilities of the deployed soldiers.[133]

These increased capabilities resulted in more requirements of the captains, lieutenants and sergeants on the field. Today's infantry units, for example, have to master an increased number of tasks and technical procedures, to operate numerous communication systems and complex weapons systems, to integrate more enablers in their tactical maneuver, and to be able to operate in a complex legal framework, among many more aspects. Without even considering the type of mission or enemy, this complexity of parameters has a clear impact on leaders, who are expected to be proficient in the assets they use in operations.

In addition, operations now mainly take place in a multinational environment, and units need to coordinate with allied forces, host nation forces, interagency partners, non-governmental organizations and journalists. Although this aspect is probably less relevant at the lowest tactical echelons, all junior leaders are now expected to be able to coordinate with these actors.

Contemporary operations have dictated the requirements for junior leaders in both the French and the U.S. armies, even before the doctrine could evolve. The tactical leader today must be technologically savvy, have some notions of media training and some legal framework, must be able to process a significant volume of information and make timely tactical decisions, knowing that any of his or her actions can, someday, be judged by the media, the population among which he operates, or even a court of law. All of these

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[133] CDEF, *L'Armée de Terre Française 1978-2015*, 45.

requirements are in addition to the "traditional" qualities required of an army leader, and

this paints a very demanding picture. It is hence not surprising that the retention numbers

have decreased in both the U.S. Army[134] and the French Army[135] at the peak of their

operational commitments. Such demands on young leaders are difficult to sustain in the

long term, especially when considering the toll on families.[136]

We now have to analyze the conclusions reached by both armies, considering

their respective context, and how these aspects, in addition to the lessons learned of

recent operations, have influenced the respective leadership models.

<u>Diverging Conclusions</u>

In spite of their comparable experiences, both armies have reacted quite

differently in the way they adapted their leadership models.

First, it must be noted that both armies have conducted a vast renewal or rewriting

of their capstone doctrine, well beyond the sole aspects of leadership, since the beginning

of the century. For the French army, this doctrinal evolution has been evolving along with

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[134] Tom Shanker, "Young Officers Leaving Army at High Rate," *The New York Times*, April 10, 2006, accessed April 5, 2016, http://www.nytimes.com/2006/04/10/washington/10army.html?_r=0.

[135] Jean-Dominique Merchet, "Armée de Terre, un 'Taux d'Attrition' Trop Élevé," *Secret Défense* (blog), April 14, 2010, accessed April 5, 2016, http://secretdefense.blogs.liberation.fr/2010/04/14/armee-de-terre-un-taux-dattrition-trop-eleve/.

[136] Brigid Schulte, "Strain on Military Families Affect Young Children, Report Says," *The Washington Post*, July 22, 2013, accessed April 5, 2016, https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/strain-on-military-families-affects-young-children-report-says/2013/07/21/4f2c9594-f24c-11e2-bdae-0d1f78989e8a_story.html.

the institutions that produce the doctrine[137] as the recently professional French Army

adapted its organizations towards a more mature model. The evolution of doctrine was

rendered necessary by the increased use of ad-hoc units in operations and the need for a

refined common language to operate efficiently in diverse environments.[138] Currently, the

main proponent of Army doctrine in France, the CDEF, does not have quite the same

prerogatives than its American counterpart. The U.S. Army institution in charge of

doctrine, namely the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), was comparatively

much older and had supervised several changes of the U.S. doctrine.[139] The process for

the U.S., consequently, was more mature, and the structure of the doctrine easier to grasp.

This renewal of doctrine took several years to complete for both armies, but by

2010, the new doctrine was complete. As previously discussed in chapter 2, the

conclusions about leadership were very different in the French and the U.S. armies. The

French army basically acknowledged that its junior leaders were fit for command in

complex environments and performed as expected, as pointed by several lessons learned

documents. The corresponding doctrine is hence not really specific about leader

requirements or the principles of leadership, however, it recognizes a duality in the art of

command and does not exclude "detailed command" in opposition to "mission

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[137] Pascal Vennesson, "Penser les Guerres Nouvelles: la Doctrine Militaire en Questions," *Pouvoirs* (April 2008): 85.

[138] Ibid., 86.

[139] Jeffrey S. Wilson, "Transformational Leadership: William DePuy's Vision for the Army," *Military Review* (September-October 2011): 70.

command," the former being deemed appropriate under certain circumstances.[140] There was very little debate in the French military circles about leadership and the way it was taught to aspiring officers and NCOs. This does not suggest that debate is not allowed within French military circles: topics like the future of European defense, the evolutions of the defense budget, or France's role in NATO, for example, have been massively debated and the debate continues among many people.

The U.S. Army has undergone much more debate about leadership and its relation with Mission Command. Ever since the publication of the corresponding doctrine and its strong advocacy by the Army leadership,[141] the connections between Mission Command as a philosophy and its leadership component have been discussed in many articles and other sources.[142] It must be noted that all these sources are supportive of a leadership model that promotes initiative at the lower echelons. However, certain articles and document express concern about the envisioned difficulty to change mentalities and drive the subordinates to seize initiative. This is especially true within a military culture which remains commander-centric[143] and in which the tolerance for mistakes is small. Others analyze this evolution in the leadership model through different lenses, but the number of

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[140] CDEF, *FT-05*, 2011, 22.

[141] General Dempsey, when he was Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, strongly advocated the instillation of Mission Command not only in the Army but across all services, as expressed in several publications. Martin E. Dempsey, *Mission Command White Paper* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2012), 8.

[142] Gregory Fontenot and Kevin C. M. Benson, "The Conundrum of Mission Command," *The Army Magazine* (June 2013): 33.

[143] Ibid., 35.

articles, variety of communication and other discussion explaining the principles of this new philosophy is telling. It suggests that the Army as a whole is not familiar with a leadership model promoting initiative and accepting risk. This is actually consistent with the surveys of leadership perception covered in chapter 2. However, there is another possible reason for the differences in the way both armies changed.

<div align="center">The Inertia of Experience</div>

Operational experience of an army is a significant driver for change, but it cannot be the sole explanation for the different conclusions reached by the French Army and the U.S. Army and the evolution of their respective leadership models. Another possible reason for these different conclusions, parallel to the ones already mentioned, is the timeframe of our study. Operational experience, and the way it drives change in an army, is always updating and continuously processed by each army. The purpose of this process is to ensure that deploying units are trained in accordance with the latest requirements of various theaters. This is true of the French and the U.S. Army.

However, in this case, the period considered and the operational experience is different. The U.S. Army was engaged in Iraq as early as 2003, and it faced a brutal insurgency as early as 2004.[144] Operation Iraqi Freedom, as discussed, was the major operational driver for change in the U.S. Army, and the renewed doctrine was published

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[144] The "black swans" turning the paradigm of a successful U.S. intervention in Iraq happened during April 2004: the revelation of mistreatment of prisoners in the Abu Ghraib prison by American soldiers, the start of the shia insurrection led by Moqtada Al Sadr in Southern Iraq, and the murder of four Blackwater operatives in Fallujah. This is a turning point in the operation. Michel Goya, *La Fin des Guerres Majeures*, 197.

at the turn of 2009 and 2010. It took five to six years to process the information and to

provide a leadership doctrine coherent with the new context of operations.

The situation in the French Army during the same period was different. The Army

experienced episodic combat in different theaters, Ivory Coast being the principal during

the years 2003-2004. The French Army was not significantly facing such violent combat

conditions, and would not until the reinforcement of French presence in Afghanistan in

2008. The death of ten French soldiers in an ambush in August 2008 was the main event

that drove the evolutions of the French Army. It may seem artificial, but this ambush,

targeting a prestigious French airborne unit had a tremendous impact in the public

opinion and the media.[145] It took several months of adaptation for French units to be

properly equipped with extra protection and weapons in Afghanistan, and several years to

"dust off" the doctrine, especially for counterinsurgency and stability operations.[146] This

means that the prompts for change in the U.S. Army and in the French Army were three

to four years apart. In the considered period of this study, this is a significant difference.

Consequently, it could be argued that the French Army is not quite yet at the end of its

doctrinal and organizational transformation in the wake of the latest operations. This

difference in time also underlines the different priorities of both armies in the recent

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[145] Several news media at the time noted failures in the conception and the execution of the operation, including failures of intelligence, shortcomings in fire support and lack of media experience. David Servenay, "Embuscade d'Uzbin: les Trois Erreurs de l'Armée Française," *Rue* 89, September 4, 2008, accessed April 16, 2016, http://rue89.nouvelobs.com/2008/09/04/embuscade-duzbin-les-trois-erreurs-de-larmee-francaise-64400.

[146] Vincent Desportes, "A Distant Conflict: France and the Afghanistan War," *World Politics Review*, January 25, 2011, accessed April 16, 2016, http://www.world politicsreview.com/articles/7671/a-distant-conflict-france-and-the-afghanistan-war.

years. The French favor rapid adaptation over doctrinal changes, while the U.S. seems to upgrade the doctrine on a more frequent basis.

In addition, it is fair to assume that leadership doctrine requires more time to be successfully modified than tactical doctrine.[147] Tactics involve procedures implemented through training; leadership requires the development of a collective culture to evolve. The fact that the U.S. Army is still implementing its Mission Command doctrinal concept is revealing of this difficulty. In addition, each army tends to validate its own doctrine and concepts when deployed in operations. This is true of the U.S. Army[148] and the French Army,[149] and contributes to explain why organizational culture is slower to evolve.

Consequently, the difference in conclusions pertaining to leadership in both armies might be linked to a less mature reflection in the French Army, because its drivers for change are more recent than in the U.S. Army. However, the most recent development of both armies being out of the scope of this study, this aspect is still difficult to consider.

The context in which operational experience happens, and how it drives change, is unquestionably one of the principal reasons explaining how different both armies are.

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[147] For example, the U.S. Army Field Manual for Counterinsurgency was published in 2006. The Mission Command philosophy was only introduced in 2009 and is still being implemented in the U.S. Army.

[148] Several reports of the initial campaign in Iraq were ecstatic about the performance of the U.S. military, considered "one of the signal achievements in military history." Max Boot, "The New American Way of War," *Foreign Affairs* (July-August 2003): 82.

[149] The French reports on the Operation Serval in Mali contain "a great deal of self-congratulations." Shurkin, *France's War in Mali*, 27.

However, it is not the only aspect, and before considering cultural implications, it is necessary to observe the differences in initial training of junior leaders.

<center>Initial Training of Junior Leaders in Both Armies</center>

One of the reasons explaining the differences in the way junior leaders perceive themselves, and are perceived by the institution, can be the different initial training models in the French Army and in the U.S. Army. The most significant difference is the duration of the initial training, for both officers and NCOs. Without analyzing in detail or comparing the merits of each system, this aspect unquestionably has an influence on junior leader development.

The U.S. army generally relies on a shorter initial training for officers and NCOs, with the notable exception of the U.S. Military Academy, which integrates a university degree in its curriculum. Other sources of commissioning[150] in the U.S. Army provide basic training and basic leadership training whose duration is usually counted in weeks and can include nonresident training.[151] Upon commissioning, the officers complete their training in their respective branch schools, with different requirements and different durations depending on their specialty.

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[150] Either through the Officer Candidates School (OCS) or through the Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC). Headquarters, Department of the Army, Department of the Army (DA) Pamphlet 600-3, *Commissioned Officer Professional Development and Career Management* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2014), 24.

[151] Ibid., 26.

In comparison, the French junior leaders receive quite an extensive training regimen.[152] Depending on their profile, cadets spend up to two or three years in basic training, during which they commission, and at least one year in branch school–regardless of their possible previous experience as a NCO–before their first operational assignment. Even comparing the small population of military academy graduates, a French officer spends two years attending university education after high school, followed by three years in the academy and one year in branch school before joining his or her first unit. The total initial training time is six years, including a master's degree from the military academy.

Unsurprisingly, the initial training of the average French junior officer allows the institution to expand on a broad range of subjects, when the U.S. Army initial training system admittedly covers the basic requirements, and expects officers to continue their personal development through their careers with a series of milestones and training courses conditioning their promotion.[153] Consequently, the cultural stereotype of the young, inexperienced lieutenant trained by his platoon sergeant is less relevant in the French Army.

The NCO training systems are similarly different in both armies. In the U.S. Army, where every NCO begins his career as a private, short courses condition the accession to each rank in the hierarchy–institutional training is only one aspect of the

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[152] French Army, "Formation dans l'Armée de Terre," February 19, 2015, accessed April 13, 2016, http://www.defense.gouv.fr/terre/formation-entrainement/formation/formation-dans-l-armee-de-terre.

[153] Headquarters, Department of the Army, DA Pamphlet 600-3, 24.

leader development model for NCOs and has to be completed by operational training and self-development.[154]

The French NCOs, by comparison, receive a common instruction in a NCO academy which lasts either four or nine months, depending on whether they are recruited from the junior enlisted population or from the civilian world, and then another four to six months of resident training in their respective branch schools.[155]

This difference is explained by the fact that academies and branch schools in France usually aim at providing leaders that are immediately deployable in operations upon their arrival in their first unit. This is facilitated by the small size of the French Army compared to the U.S. Army – extended resident training in the latter would require considerable infrastructure and manpower.

Both leader initial development models seem to be coherent with the requirements expressed by the respective army. Another difference can be noted regarding the career prospects of NCOs and officers in the armies. A university degree is not a requirement in the French Army to be commissioned as an officer, and consequently, around 50 percent of the officer population is constituted by former NCOs or enlisted soldiers.[156] The proportion of prior enlisted officers in the U.S. Army cannot be found precisely, but it is

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[154] Headquarters, Department of the Army, Department of the Army (DA) Pamphlet 600-25, *U.S. Army Noncommissioned Officer Professional Development Guide* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2015), 5.

[155] French Army, "Formation dans l'Armée de Terre," February 19, 2015, accessed April 13, 2016, http://www.defense.gouv.fr/terre/formation-entrainement/formation/formation-dans-l-armee-de-terre.

[156] S'Engager, "Sous-Officier," accessed April 13, 2016, https://www.recrutement.terre.defense.gouv.fr/parcours/sous-officier.

most certainly lower.[157] This is concurrent with the average age of officers, which is significantly higher in the French Army than in the U.S. Army.[158]

Assuming that the relatively more experienced and more extensively trained French officer corps serving in junior positions of leadership is the reason why the conclusions reached on the leadership models are different is probably inaccurate. However, it can be argued that a longer initial training and a more permeable officer corps to prior enlisted soldier has a significant influence on the leader development and education and on the maturity of young leaders when operating in complex environments. This can also contribute to explain why the French Army can implement lessons learned directly in the training of units rather than having to frequently update its doctrine as an educational object.

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[157] One source in particular affirms that manpower cuts in the officer's population affects disproportionately the prior enlisted officers in the proportion of one to five. Consequently, if 20 percent of the officer population is considered to be disproportionate for prior enlisted members, it is probably safe to assume that the actual proportion of prior enlisted officers is below 20 percent. Stars and Stripes, "Report: Army Officer Cuts Disproportionately Affect Prior Enlisted," November 13, 2014, accessed April 13, 2016, http://www.stripes.com/news/report-army-officer-cuts-disproportionately-affect-prior-enlisted-1.314041.

[158] 62.6 percent of the active duty officers in the U.S. Army are aged 35 or lower, compared to 30 percent in the French Army. The age difference can also be explained by the different career systems of both institutions but is nevertheless significant. Source for the U.S. Army: Department of Defense, *2014 Demographics, Profile of the Military Community* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2014), 36. Source for the French Army: Carine Le Page et Jérôme Bensoussan, *Les Militaires et leurs Familles* (Paris, France: Ministry of Defense, 2010), 16.

The Significance of Culture

Chapter 2 discussed the organizational military culture of the French and the U.S. Army, and how they differ from the national culture of both countries. These organizational cultures have been shaped by the recent history of both armies, but they remain questioned when it comes to the exercise of authority and the evolutions of leadership.

The U.S. army, when it comes to culture, appears to be very self-critical, and surprisingly unyielding. This is apparent in the number of sources criticizing the mechanisms of change through artifacts and buzzwords without serious leadership commitment.[159] This is also somewhat apparent in the ambient skepticism shown about the real implementation of the Mission Command philosophy and the required change of culture in the U.S. Army leadership.[160] This "checklist mentality" is still present in the U.S. Army and the empowerment of subordinates within the commander's intent contradicts some enduring trends of military leadership. Consequently, the Army recognized through a series of studies that toxic leadership[161] and a tendency for

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[159] Leonard Wong, "Op-Ed: Changing the Army's Culture of Change," Strategic Studies Institute, May 12, 2014, accessed April 17, 2016, http://www.strategicstudies institute.army.mil/index.cfm/articles/Changing-the-Armys-Culture-of-Cultural-Change/2014/05/12.

[160] Guthrie, 28.

[161] Among other things, toxic leaders are defined as leaders who "micromanage their subordinates." In 2011, a survey across the Army identified that 83% of the personnel had experienced toxic leadership within the previous year. Jennifer Matson, "Battling Toxic Leadership," U.S. Army Official Website, June 27, 2012, accessed April 16, 2016, http://www.army.mil/article/82622/Battling_toxic_leadership/.

micromanagement were in direct contradiction of its will to implement Mission Command.

The U.S. Army relies on a culture of excellence and a "zero-defect" mentality, which leaves very little room for error.[162] This culture of excellence is not negative by itself. However, it may contradict the renewed leadership model, especially when the core of this model is to empower subordinates. For a military leader trained in this culture of perfection, it implies partially renouncing to an extensive span of control. In addition, this culture can lead officers to "cover-up" mistakes and bad news, a risk-averse trait, which increases up the military hierarchy.[163] Younger leaders, who have experienced a more flexible command climate, especially when deployed,[164] are expected by the senior Army leaders advocating the Mission Command philosophy to be the starting point of this cultural shift.

In addition, this culture of excellence, combined with extremely strict accountability for failure, can lead not only to dishonest or falsified reports,[165] but also sometimes to ethical fade, in which dishonesty to answer an allegedly meaningless

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[162] Richard D. Heyward, "Embedding Mission Command in Army Culture" (Master's Thesis, U.S. Army War College, 2013), 19, accessed April 16, 2016, http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a589283.pdf.

[163] Ibid.

[164] Ibid., 20.

[165] This falsification of data is explained by the extensive requirements and the necessity to avoid risk, a behavior seemingly common in various areas, such as mandatory training, or performance reports. Leonard Wong and Stephen J. Gerras, *Lying to Ourselves: Dishonesty in the Army Profession* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College Press, 2015), 11.

requirement is disguised in "prudent risk acceptance" or other euphemisms.[166] Risk

aversion and the culture of excellence that accompanies it is still very present in the U.S.

military, and sources generally agree that really empowering subordinates will require

more time and proper involvement of leaders of all ranks to change a culture of excessive

accountability, which still prevails strongly in the U.S. Army.[167] This culture of personal

responsibility is, again, not negative in itself, but to empower junior leaders requires, at

some point and during training, to accept the fact that they might commit mistakes.

The French Army's culture is harder to describe when it comes to leadership. Less

reflection seems to occur about the exercise of authority, which has not significantly

changed since the publication of the capstone doctrine in 2003.[168] Comparing the core

documents, however, provides a different perspective on the way discipline and authority

are regarded in the French Army. For example, in the French Army, the subordinate has,

by law, the obligation to disobey an illegal order given by his commander.[169] In the U.S.

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[166] Ibid., 17-18.

[167] During his address to the 2016 Class of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, General Milley, Chief of Staff of the Army, reasserted the importance of empowering subordinates within a commander's intent, but also that this empowerment implied a clear responsibility for success from the subordinate. Gen. Mark A. Milley, "Address to the CGSOC class of 2016" (Fort Leavenworth, KS, March 22, 2016).

[168] Etat-Major de l'Armée de Terre, 2003.

[169] Ministère de la Défense, Direction de la Fonction Militaire et du Personnel Civil, Instruction N° 201710/DEF/SGA/DFP/FM/1 d'Application du Décret Relatif à la Discipline Générale Militaire, November 4, 2005, Article 7, accessed April 17, 2016, http://www.formation.terre.defense.gouv.fr/PJ/Documents/VotreEspace/Savoirvivre/refer ences/decret_discipline_generale_militaire.pdf.

Army, the subordinate has the obligation to obey legal orders of his commander.[170] The slight difference, here, lies in the fact that the French Army stresses the mutual responsibility of both the leader and his or her subordinate, while no mention of the subordinate is made in the American source document. It also emphasizes that the U.S. Army is indeed commander-centric, as noted by other sources on the exercise of Mission Command.[171]

The French Army being seemingly satisfied with its leadership model, few sources discuss in detail the leadership culture of the Army, except to acknowledge that it has significantly evolved since the foundations laid in the early 1980s, which stated the "command by objectives" philosophy that has been used ever since.[172] There is very little mention of institutional concern at the Army level about micromanaging tendencies or toxic leadership. It does not mean that these behaviors do not exist in the Army[173] or that concern does not exist, but it does indicate that there is no cultural aspect identified which would encourage these bad leadership behaviors.

Surprisingly, the reflections on the leadership culture of the French Army are mainly focused on the concern that modern, network-centric technologies will increase

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[170] Headquarters, Department of the Army, Army Regulation 600-20, *Army Command Policy* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2014), 23.

[171] Fontenot and Benson, 2013.

[172] Nécicka Lesaulnier, "Autorité et Jeunesse," *Cahiers du CESAT* (December 2014): 43.

[173] The recent accusations of misconduct of French soldiers deployed in the Central African Republic, pending the developments of the investigation, stress out that no large human organization is immune to unethical or criminal behavior.

the potential tendency of commanders to micromanage their subordinates,[174] short-circuiting the chain of command, and potentially suppressing their freedom of action.[175] This concern of abandoning the principles of autonomy and subsidiarity in the French Army for an increased control of the hierarchy is real, and is repeatedly mentioned in the lessons learned documents studied in chapter 2. This increased control has been observed in Afghanistan, for example, after the summer of 2011 during which several French soldiers were killed in action over a short period of time, a series of events, which prompted then President Sarkozy to reduce the number of tactical operations and increase internal control of the troops.[176]

One last aspect of the French culture is that the exigency of accountability for leaders is not as strong as it is in the U.S. Army. One possible reason for this is that most of the officers and senior NCOs in the French Army are career officers and cannot be expelled unless they commit a serious offense. It is consequently fair to assume that mistakes and errors have fewer consequences in the French Army than in the U.S. Army. Another side aspect of this difference in culture lays in the fact that yearly evaluations in the French Army are not the sole driver for promotions.[177]

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[174] Pierre-Yves Ginot, "La Véritable Ecole du Commandement, Certes… Mais Est-ce Encore Suffisant? L'Impact sur le Commandement des Outils Actuels d'Information et de Communication," *Cahiers du CESAT* (December 2014): 45.

[175] Pierre Goetz and Olivia Cahuzac-Soave, *Impact de la Numérisation sur l'Exercice du Commandement* (Paris, France: CEIS, 2015), 23.

[176] Nathalie Guibert, "Drôle de Guerre à Tora," *Le Monde,* November 10, 2011, accessed April 17, 2016, http://abonnes.lemonde.fr/international/article/2011/10/11/drole-de-guerre-a-tora_1585734_3210.html.

[177] The "up-or-out" system, fueled yearly evaluations and peer competition, can arguably deter risk-taking for career-ambitious leaders. Donald E. Vandergriff, *Personnel*

The Wartime Drivers of Change

How the leadership model evolves in the French Army and in the U.S. Army is not solely tied to lessons learned from operational experiences. Several aspects can explain the difference in the conclusions reached by both armies when processing comparable experiences.

The operations led by each army are one of the most potent drivers for change. Both armies have evolved during the last fifteen years because of the conflicts in which they took part. However, to understand the leadership models, we had to expand on the respective experiences and the context of the experiences for both armies. Culture, specifically military culture, is probably the key aspect to understanding how and why armies operate as they do, and more importantly how they consider leadership, how they apply it and how they adapt their respective leadership models.

Military culture is a complex notion. It is fueled by education, experience, national culture, but also the fact that militaries are conservative bodies in essence, which tend to validate their own operational concepts. Describing in detail what constitutes military culture and discussing the differences of French and U.S. culture is not within the scope of this thesis, it is arguable that culture is a unifying aspect of leadership evolution in any army.

Reform and Military Effectiveness (Washington, DC: Center for Defense Information at the Project on Government Oversight, 2014), 18.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

How Leaders are Made

There are constantly hundreds of cadets and trainees in the French Army, thousands in the U.S. Army. The future lieutenants and sergeants, from both sides of the Atlantic Ocean, are trained to the latest standards of their respective armies to lead troops in operations. By the time any lieutenant receives a first command, the training he or she received is the fruit of many components that interact with each other in a complex pattern.

The French Army and the U.S. Army train leaders which will, probably, work together in the future, through enhanced bilateral cooperation, or within a NATO mission, or within any other type of multinational framework. Both Armies' doctrine is comparable, and yet, there are significant chances that they will be different officers, products of different education models.

These models are the result of operational experience, which provides lessons from the latest operations conducted by the army, but also from other inputs. National culture of France and the U.S. leads to different models and education. The armies have different personnel systems and initial training for junior leaders, directly derived from their organizational culture. When a lieutenant joins his or her first unit, expectations for his or her performance differ and are driven by all these factors. More importantly, his or her perception of leadership will be different, and the mentoring he or she receives from senior leaders will also contribute to perpetuate this leadership model.

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Research Hypothesis Analyzed

The research hypothesis of this thesis was that operational experience is an important driver for change in the way armies train and educate their leaders. However, the way experience is processed and the conclusions drawn from the experience also depend on national and military culture.

The operational experience that both armies acquire and process in the way they change is constituted in the lessons learned by tactical units in operations. It is also enriched by mutual observation, reflections made by officers in institutional or independent publications, analysis by scholars that contribute to broaden the scope of reflection. All these elements are processed by army institutions to produce updated doctrine and training requirements, in order to better prepare units for their future missions. This is chronologically the first product of institutional reflection.

The second product, which takes significantly longer than the first one, is to synthetize this operational experience, in its broad understanding, and to use it to enhance the leadership models. This study provides information through chapter 4 about how processing this experience to obtain a renewed leadership model takes time, and how this process is filtered through each army's organizational culture. The operational experience can be regarded as the common driver for change. The culture of the French Army or of the U.S. Army contributes to explain the differences in the conclusions, and more importantly, in the way these conclusions are transformed in doctrinal evolutions.

The findings of this research are consistent with the main research hypothesis. They confirm the intricate system of interaction between the lessons learned, the

stimulus, and the way they are processed through culture in the French Army and in the U.S. Army.

<center>Suggestions for the French Army and the U.S. Army</center>

As expressed in chapters 1 and 3, the purpose of this thesis is mostly to inform, because recommendations would have to consider the author's possible cultural biases about leadership. However, suggestions can be made to policymakers from both countries, or to researchers interested in the evolution of leadership in the French Army or the U.S. Army.

Processing operational experience is institutionalized in both armies in accordance with organizational decisions and processes. These decisions and processes were outside the scope of this thesis. However, there is little evidence of a cultural approach to leadership in the way both armies reflect on their respective models. To study operational experience with a greater awareness of one's own culture would facilitate the comparison to other national models. It would also contribute to enrich the reflection on doctrinal development pertaining to leadership.

Another possible domain of improvement could be to reinforce mutual observation. Sharing not only the lessons learned themselves, but their analysis, would contribute to a better mutual understanding and more efficient collaboration between the French and the U.S. Army.

Lastly, enhancing cultural awareness in the early stages of junior leader development and education, not only through language training but also through partially common procedures could be useful. If officers were trained to be more aware of different cultures, they could arguably develop a broader understanding of their own

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culture and be more sentient of the potential biases they may have. Stereotypes and self-congratulatory analysis are still too frequent in both armies, and this cultural awareness would contribute to balance this trend toward a more objective approach.

What the Researcher Learned

The researcher approached this project with a slightly different approach from the actual content, focused on the operational experience. The importance of organizational and, to a degree, national culture in the way an army evolves was not an initial area of focus. It appears that leadership, unlike purely tactical procedures, is defined by the way it is perceived by the collective body of the army, both in France and in the U.S. In this sense, leadership is more difficult to transform by a force-management-type of process because, at its core, it requires educating younger officers and NCOs in a different perspective. This is a lengthy process, which demands time and sustained effort.

Recommendation for Future Research

Several areas of study could enrich this research and benefit policymakers or other stakeholders in both the French and the U.S. Army. It would be interesting to conduct the same kind of research from an American perspective, for two reasons. The first reason is that a U.S. Army officer would have easier access to classified documents and lessons learned, and would be able to confirm or to nuance the assumptions drawn in chapter one. The second reason is that his or her perspective would be framed through different cultural lenses and it would balance the inevitable French view on the subject of leadership evolution.

Another possible area of study would be to compare the detailed processes that both armies use to feed the evolution of their doctrine with the lessons learned in operations. This research would allow a more detailed insight on the actual influence of culture in the process of implementing lessons learned and transforming doctrine.

Finally, and somewhat further from the topic of leadership and leader development, the literature in chapter 2 hinted at the fact that the connection between national and military culture is not as obvious as it seems. In certain aspects, the research demonstrated that French and U.S. cultures could contradict each other. Researching in greater detail how these cultures are connected, taking into consideration education and shared values, would allow a better understanding of the military culture of each nation.

On Future Wars and Future Leaders

France and the U.S. will probably increase their military cooperation, and continue to serve in the same theaters, face similar challenges, and put younger generations of junior leaders through the crucible of combat. Officers and NCOs are sent to lead soldiers in increasingly complex environments and have to overcome a tremendous amount of challenges in order to perform efficiently. Any army's responsibility lies in not repeating the mistakes of the past. In this regard, considering how military institutions evolve and what they ask of their leaders is no easy task. It remains essential to better understand the foundations of military change. This understanding must be mutual to be truly enriching, in an increased multinational environment looking ahead to an uncertain future.

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